Masthead Logo

NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law

Volume 3
Issue 1 Volume 3, Number 1, 1981

Article 9

1981

Dames & Moore v. Regan
Louis D. Montressor

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Montressor, Louis D. (1981) "Dames & Moore v. Regan," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol3/iss1/9

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal
of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

COMMENT

Dames & Moore v. Regan
A seemingly interminable national ordeal ended when the Americans held hostage in Iran were released on January 20, 1981.' Implementation of the terms of the agreements between Iran and the United
States,' the mechanism through which the "Iranian Hostage Crisis"
was resolved, has however, prompted much litigation.'
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,4 the Supreme Court reviewed the
agreements, and the executive orders and treasury regulations issued in
compliance with them, to determine their constitutionality. Specifically, the Court addressed the question of whether executive authority
was exceeded when the President: 1) ordered the nullification of attachments of Iranian assets obtained by United States nationals; 2) ordered the transfer of blocked Iranian assets; and, 3) ordered the suspension of all United States nationals' claims against the Iranian
government.5 In addition, the contention that issuance of these orders
constituted a taking under the fifth amendment's Just Compensation
Clause was evaluated.'
The "Iranian Hostage Crisis" arose when diplomatic personnel
stationed in the United States Embassy in Tehran were seized by Iranian militants on November 4, 1979. 7 Ten days later, President Carter
responded by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA).' He issued an order in which he declared the existence of
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
2. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, reprinted in 81 DEP'T ST. BULL 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Agreement I], and
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, id. at 3 [hereinafter
cited as Agreement II].
3. See, e.g., Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). The court observed that, by September 1980, 96
suits had been filed in that district alone. Id. at 74.
4. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
5. Id. at 660.
6. Id. at 674 n.6, 688-89.
7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
8. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, § 201, 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706
(Supp. II 1978). The President is authorized to take certain actions when the national
security, foreign policy or economy of the United States is faced with an unusual or
extraordinary external threat. Id. § 1701(a).
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a national emergency g and blocked all assets of the Iranian government
located in the United States." Pursuant to that order, the Secretary of
the Treasury promulgated regulations that rendered null and void any
transfer of property in which Iran had an interest.11 Subsequently, the
Secretary granted a general license permitting judicial proceedings
against the blocked assets,12 including prejudgment attachments." The
license was revocable at any time."
After the general license was granted, the petitioner Dames &
Moore filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, 5 against the Government of Iran and others," to
recover money owed to it for services performed under a contract. The
court issued orders enabling the petitioners to attach certain property
17
of the defendants to secure a possible future judgment.
On January 19, 1981, the Executive entered into two agreements
with the Government of Iran effectuating the release of the embassy
personnel."8 The agreements provided: 1) that all litigation between
the government of one nation and nationals of the other and all prejudgment attachments obtained in such litigation be terminated; 9 2)
that the United States transfer to Iran all blocked assets held by
American banks;20 and, 3) that any claims not settled by the parties
within six months from the effective date of the agreements, i.e. July
19, 1981, be settled through binding arbitration to be conducted by an
9. See id. § 1701(b), which dictates that the President must declare the existence of a
national emergency before he may invoke this statute.
10. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979). The President's order:
blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its.
. controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in or come within
the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
Id.
11. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(a) (1980).
12. 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a) (1980). Id. § 535.203(c) had previously permitted a transfer
after the effective date of the blocking order only if a special license was obtained from
the Treasury Department. Id.
13. 31 C.F.R. § 5,35.418 (1980). This section clarified the meaning of "judicial proceedings" in § 535.504(a), indicating that prejudgment attachments were included. Section 535.418 also reinforced the fact that transfer of blocked assets without specific license was prohibited. Id.
14. 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980).
15. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. 79-04918 (C.D.Cal.
filed Dec. 19, 1979), cited in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at 664 n.4 (1981).
16. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 663-64, where the Court listed the other defendants: The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and a number of Iranian banks.
17. Id.
18. Agreement I and Agreement II, supra note 2.
19. Agreement I, supra note 2, General Principles (B), at 2.
20. Id. points 2 & 3.
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Iran-United States Claims Tribunal."' A portion of the transferred assets was to be deposited in a security account to fund the Claims
Tribunal."2
To implement the agreements, several executive orders were issued the same day,s3 among other things, nullifying all attachments obtained by United States nationals"' subsequent to the issuance of the
November 14, 1979 blocking order'" and directing the transfer of all
Iranian assets held by American banks, ' non-banking institutions"
and persons subject to United States jurisdiction.' 8 A short time later,
another executive order was issued,'9 suspending the legal effect in the
United States courts of all nationals' claims against Iran" that could
be entertained by the Claims Tribunal under the terms of the
agreements. 1
Before the claims suspension order was issued, Dames & Moore
had moved for summary judgment in the pending contract action."2
The district court granted that motion and awarded damages to the
petitioner.33 The petitioner then attempted to execute the judgment in
a Washington state court." The district court, however, stayed both
the execution of its judgment pending appeal by the defendants and
any further proceedings in the action in light of the claims suspension
21. Agreement II, supra note 2, arts. I & II, at 3.
22. Agreement 1, supra note 2, points 2 & 3. An initial amount of one billion dollars
was to be deposited in an account in a mutually agreeable "Central Bank" which would
serve as escrow agent. As awards were distributed by the Claims Tribunal, the account
was to be replenished by the Government of Iran. Id. point 7.
23. Exec. Order No. 12,276, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-14 (1981) (establishing escrow accounts), Exec. Order Nos. 12,277-81, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915-24 (1981) (directing transfers of
Iranian Government assets), Exec. Order No. 12,282, 46 Fed. Reg. 7925 (1981) (revoking
prohibitions against dealing with Iran), Exec. Order No. 12,283, 46 Fed. Reg. 7927 (1981)
(prohibiting prosecution of legal claims by the hostages against Iran), Exec. Order No.
12,284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7929-30 (1981) (restricting transfers of the former Shah of Iran's
property), and Exec. Order No. 12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7931-32 (1981) (establishing the
President's Commission on Hostage Compensation).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,277, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915-16 (1981).
25. See supra note 10, for the relevant text of the blocking order.
26. Exec. Order No. 12,277-79, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915-20 (1981).
27. Exec. Order No. 12,280, 46 Fed. Reg. 7921-22 (1981).
28. Exec. Order No. 12,281, 46 Fed. Reg. 7923-24 (1981).
29. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981). Ronald Reagan, who by this
time had been sworn in as President, issued the order on February 24, 1981. Id.
30. Agreement II, supra note 2, art. VII(3), at 4, defines Iran as "the Government of
Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, and any agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any political subdivision thereof." Id.
31. See Agreement H, supra note 1, art. 11, at 3.
32. 453 U.S. at 666. Dames & Moore made this motion for summary judgment on
January 27, 1981. Id.
33. Id. Damages were for $3,436,694.30 plus interest. Id. at 664.
34. Id. at 666.
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order; moreover, it ordered the vacation of the prejudgment attachments previously obtained.88
Dames & Moore instituted a separate action in the district court
in response to the aforementioned executive orders." The petitioner
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of
those orders, alleging that the President had exceeded his statutory
and constitutional powers when he issued them.37 The court denied the
petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed its complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit docketed Dames & Moore's appeal on June 3, 1981. The Supreme Court
then granted Dames & Moore's petition for a writ of certiorari before
judgment" "because the lower courts had reached conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President's action"' 0 and because the agreements obligated the United States to transfer the blocked assets by
July 19, 19811 in order not to be in breach of the agreements. " '
Abstract constitutional boundaries delimiting the exercise of executive power simply do not exist. Instead, as Justice Jackson observed
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,'4 "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power to better secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government ....

Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending

upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."'4 Employing an admittedly "somewhat over-simplified grouping" of situations, Justice Jackson devised a framework for analyzing the impact of
executive-legislative interaction on the constitutionality of executive
assertions of power." He articulated three situations in which such
questions may arise: 1) "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress";"6 2) "[wlhen the President7
acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority";
and, 3) "[wlhen the President takes measures incompatible with the
35. Id. at 667. The Court order was issued on May 28, 1981. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 668. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (1976), which authorizes a petitioner to make
such an application at any time before the court of appeals renders judgment.
40. 453 U.S. at 660.
41. Id. at 665.
42. Id. at 660.
43. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 635.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47.

Id. at 637.
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expressed or implied will of Congress.""'
In the first situation, the President's authority is at its zenith, supported by "all that [the President] possesses in his own right plus all

that Congress can delegate."'

In the second situation, the President

can only rely on his independent powers, though there may be a "zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which [the distribution of authority] is uncertain."50 In the third
situation, the President's power is at its nadir, supported by "his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter."'
In Youngstown, President Truman issued an order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and to operate most of
the country's steel mills in response to a union workers' strike which
occurred while the United States was engaged in the Korean conflict in
1952." The Court found no congressional authorization to issue the executive order; in fact, congressional refusal to authorize the President

to dispose of labor strikes in this fashion was found.' 3 Nor did the
Court find inherent executive power to issue the order." Justice Black,
writing for the majority, rejected the Executive's contention that the
President's article II Commander in Chief powers," in the "theater of
war" context, extended to taking possession of private property in the

United States to settle a domestic labor dispute. 5 Thus, the seizure

48. Id.
49. Id. at 635. Justice Jackson, while noting that if the President's action is held
unconstitutional, then the federal government as a whole would lack power to take action, posited that such presidential action pursuant to an act of Congress is supported by
a strong presumption of constitutionality and that one who challenges such action carries
a heavy burden of persuasion. Id. at 636-37.
50. Id. at 637. Congressional acquiescence was considered to allow, possibly even invite, assertions of independent executive power. Id.
51. Id. In order to sustain such actions by the President, the Court would have to
find that Congress was not able to act on the matter. In this situation, the Court would
have to carefully scrutinize the action, as it would endanger the equilibrium of our constitutional system. Id. at 637-38.
52. Id. at 582-83.
53. Id. at 586. The majority found that Congress refused to permit governmental
seizures in emergencies as such action would interefere with the collective bargaining
process. Id. Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence found that Congress consciously withheld authority for governmental seizures by the President so as to require the President
to go to Congress for emergency legislation if such was needed. Id. at 602.
54. Id.at 587.
55. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
56. 343 U.S. at 587. Implicit in the concurrence of Justice Jackson is the notion that
the President's inherent powers are much more circumscribed by congressional powers in
the domestic realm than in the foreign affairs realm, id. at 644-46, in which the President
is "the sole organ of the federal government." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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order was held to be an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.67
The challenged executive action in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp." offers a contrast to the type of action taken in
Youngstown. Unlike Youngstown, Curtiss-Wright dealt with an executive order that prohibited certain international commercial transactions.5B The specific issue in Curtiss-Wright was whether Congress abdicated its essential functions by enacting a law that delegated to the
President the power to order, at his discretion, the prohibition of
weapons sales by United States nationals to countries involved in the
Chaco conflict. 60 The Court upheld the constitutionality of Congress's
delegation of power061

The Court's analysis focused on the nature of executive and legislative power and the extent of interaction between these branches in
the realm of foreign affairs. Highlighting the fact that "the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," the Court stressed that participation by the legislative branch in
the exercise of foreign affairs power is significantly limited.62 Moreover,
"congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to
the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."' 3 The modest nature and extent of Congress' foreign affairs
powers underscored the fact that, though Congress may itself authorize
the Executive to take action as it did in Curtiss-Wright, the Executive
possessed inherent power to take independent action as the "sole organ" of the federal government in foreign affairs."
Premised on the Curtiss-Wright Court's formulation of the nature
and extent of executive and legislative power in the realm of foreign
affairs, the Court, in United States v. Pink,65 established the principle
that the Executive has the inherent power to settle claims between
United States nationals and a foreign state. Prior to instituting this
action, the Executive had entered the Litvinov Assignment." The
agreement called for recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as the de jure government of Russia and assignment of
Russian claims against United States' nationals in return for the re57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

343 U.S. at 589.
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 329.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
Id.
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
Id. at 211.
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lease by the United States of its nationals' claims against the USSR."
The Executive commenced the action to recover the assets of a nationalized Russian company that were held by a New York State official
following liquidation of the company." The Court held that under the
Constitution, a state law that negates the effect of federal nationalization decrees on property located in New York cannot override the enforcement by the United States of its claim to the nationalized property under the Litvinov Assignment."
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, refuted the claim that
the President lacked the power to enter into such agreements in the
first place. He posited that "[plower to remove such obstacles to full
recognition [of a foreign sovereign] as settlement of claims of our nationals certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the
'sole organ of the federal government in the field of international

relations.'

"170

Judge Learned Hand expanded the Pink Court's holding in Ozanic
v. United States.71 This case involved decrees in admiralty arising
from a collision between a Yugoslav corporation-owned vessel and a
United States-owned tanker." Some time after the collision, the Yugoslav government nationalized the corporation.7 3 Subsequently, the Yugoslav government, as part of a settlement agreement between it and
the United States, agreed to release certain claims it had against the
United States arising from maritime collisions, including the claim at
74
issue.
In holding that the assignee of the Yugoslav corporation's claim
could not recover from the United States, Judge Hand stated that
Although the agreement ... did not ... profess to repeal the
consent of the United States to be sued which the Public Vessels Act had granted, we regard [the agreement] as overriding
that consent, and asserting the immunity of the United States
from suit upon any claims whose release was part of the consideration of the United States for the release of its . . . claims
against the Yugoslav Government. The constitutional power of
the President extends to the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government and the United States, at least
when it is incident to recognition of that government; and it
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 221-26.
Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 229-30.
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would be unreasonable to circumscribe it to such controversies.
The continued mutual amity between [the United States] and
other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such
compromises has existed from the earliest times ....

75

In addition to possessing inherent foreign affairs powers to settle
claims, the Executive has been delegated certain powers by Congress,
via the IEEPA, 76 that may be exercised during a declared national
emergency in response to an external threat. 77 The IEEPA had not
been invoked prior to the Iranian Hostage Crisis. The IEEPA's pertinent language, however, was drawn from its predecessor statute, the
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA).78 A trilogy of cases have provided relevant analysis of the scope of executive power as authorized
by Congress in the TWEA.
Propperv. Clark79 involved the issuance of an executive order that
both froze Austrian assets and prohibited transfers of Austrian credits
located in the United States.8 0 The issue was whether the freezing order barred a subsequent unlicensed judicial transfer of a debt owed to
an Austrian corporation to a state court-appointed receiver of the corporation.81 The transfer was held to violate the executive order.8s The
Court denied that federal interference with state court control of property resulted from this holding, asserting that Congress intended to put
foreign assets in the President's control "so that there might be a unified national policy in the administration of the [TWEA]."es
The transferability of frozen assets was again questioned in
Zittman v. McGrath." In Zittman, the Executive had issued an order,
pursuant to the TWEA, freezing German assets located in the United
States.88 The petitioners then obtained an unlicensed prejudgment attachment which was levied on a German debtor's bank accounts in the
United States."6 The Court held that the attachment did not accomplish a transfer of possession for purposes of the order and was, there75. Id. at 231.
76. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. II. 1978).
77. Id. §1701.
78. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1976). Unlike the TEEPA, the TWEA also authorized the
President to vest title to frozen assets in the Executive. Id. § 5(b).
79. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
80. Id. at 475.
81. Id. at 476.
82. Id. at 486.
83. Id. at 492-93.
84. 341 U.S. 446 (1951).
85. Id. at 448.

86. Id. at 447.
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fore, valid."7 It emphasized, however, that though the petitioner had a
lien to secure a future judgment, federal control over the assets was not
impaired, since the petitioners could not secure payment from the attached assets without a license from the Executive, the alien property
custodian.88
The Court, in Orvis v. Brownell,89 answered a question left open in
Zittman; viz., whether a creditor who had obtained an unlicensed attachment against Japanese assets subsequent to the issuance of a
freezing order, 9° also acquired an interest in the attached assets that
would support a claim against the Executive, as a lien property custodian, under the TWEA.91 Prior to the suit, the Executive refused to
issue to the petitioners a license authorizing them to execute a judgment against the attached assets. 92 The creditor argued that the sole
purpose of the TWEA was to prevent transfers of assets to occupied
countries. 93 The Court agreed that Congress did intend to prevent such
transfers; nonetheless, Congress employed language that extended the
authorization much further.94 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
held that an unlicensed attachment obtained after the issuance of a
freeze order did not create an interest that supported a claim against
the Executive.' He clarified Zittman as merely upholding a general
consent by the Executive, permitting state attachment procedures so
that creditors would have an opportunty to settle their accounts with
enemy debtors. 91
If the power to issue executive orders such as those challenged in
Dames & Moore v. Regan97 is established, an unconstitutional taking
under the fifth amendment Just Compensation Clause may occur. The
Just Compensation Clause states that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 8 One facet of the
analysis of a taking claim is determining whether the claimant possesses a property right in what is being taken." Precedents suggest
that a creditor's lien is a compensable property right.
87. Id. at 462-63. The Court refused to consider a General Ruling, issued by the Executive three to five months after the attachments in question were obtained, which specifically designated an attachment levy as a prohibited "transfer." Id. at 452.
88. Id. at 464.
89. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
90. Id. at 185.
91. Id. at 184.
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. at 187.
94. Id. at 187-88.
95. Id. at 188.
96. Id. at 187.
97. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
98. U.S.CoNsT. amend. V.
99. L.H. TiuBa, AmsmcA CONSMMrrIONAL LAw 459-60 (1978).
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In Armstrong v. United States,100 the petitioner had furnished
construction materials to a third party that had entered a shipbuilding
contract with the United States Government.' 0' Under state law, the
petitioner possessed statutory liens on the vessel and any materials not
yet part of the vessel until paid. 02 When the third party defaulted on
the Government's contract, the latter exercised a termination clause in
their contract that required the third party to transfer title and deliver
to the Government all completed and uncompleted work. 08
The Court held that there was a compensable taking of the liens
that the petitioner possessed.' 0 ' It reasoned that:
[t]he total destruction by the Government of all value of these
liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment "taking" and is not a mere
"consequential incidence" of a valid regulatory measure.
Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had none ....
It
was because the Government for its own advantage destroyed
the value of the liens, something that the Government could do
because its property was not subject to suit, but which no private purchaser could have done.' 0 '
The Just Compensation Clause "was designed to bar [the] Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens, which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'1'
Similarly, in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 107 the
Court ruled that a mortgage lien was a compensable property right.' 0 '
Under Kentucky state law, the mortgagee-bank had a property right to
retain its lien on the mortgaged property until the indebtedness that
the lien secured is paid.' 9 After the mortgagor had defaulted, a referee-in-bankruptcy ordered, pursuant to the Frazier-Lemke Act," 0 that
enforcement of the mortgage lien be stayed for five years and that the
mortgagor be allowed to retain possession."' The Court held that the
Act was unconstitutional, remarking that "[ijf the public interest re100.
101.
102.

364 U.S. 40 (1960).
Id. at 41.
Id.

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 49.
295 U.S. 555 (1935).
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 594.
Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869, § 75(s), 48 Stat. 1289 (1930) (amended 1948).
295 U.S. at 577.
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quires... the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to
relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to
proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation, the burden
of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the
public." '
Even if the fact and extent of a taking claim is uncertain, a claimant is entitled to a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for compensation at the time the "taking" occurs. 1 s This requirement is satis11
fied if a claimant has available a remedy in the Court of Claims. 4
Section 1491 of the Tucker Act, 1 which sets out the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims, confers on that court jurisdiction over claims founded
on, inter alia, the Constitution, an act of Congress or an executive
regulation.'
The Court, in Cities Service Co. v. McGrath,117 held that a taking
claim that resulted from an exercise of executive power pursuant to the
TWEA could be brought against the United States.118 An executive order had been issued which vested title and possession of two debentures in the Executive. 11 ' The petitioners had held title to the debentures prior to the vesting. 20 Pointing to the possiblity that a foreign
court might hold it liable to a holder in due course for the value of the
debentures at some future time, the petitioners asserted that enforcement of the vesting order constituted a taking."" The Court agreed
that the petitioners might suffer a double recovery.1 2 2 Nonetheless, the
petitioners were not entitled to injunctive relief, since a remedy was
available against the United States. 28
Though a claimant may otherwise be able to pursue his taking
claim in the Court of Claims, the claim may be barred by the "treaty
exception" to the Tucker Act.12 4 This exception prevents the court
from entertaining a claim that is dependent on a treaty or grows di112. Id. at 602.
113. See, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1952) (no unconstitutional taking found, since petitioner has a cause of action against the United States,
and can recoup its double liability, in the event a judgment is entered against it in the
court of a foreign country at any time in the future).
114. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974).
115. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
116. Id. § 1491.
117. 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
118. Id. at 335.
119. Id. at 331 & n.3.
120. Id. at 331.

121. Id. at 335.
122. Id. at 335-36.
123. Id. at 334-35.
124.

28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
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rectly out of it.""5
The scope of the treaty exception was first enunciated in United
States v. Weld.' 2 Weld involved a claim in the Court of Claims against
the United States for the unpaid balance of a judgment obtained by
the plaintiffs in a court specially constituted to adjudicate certain
United States citizens' claims against the British Government.' 27 Judgments awarded by the special court were funded by Great Britain in
accordance with a treaty'" between it and the United States. 2 9 The
Court affirmed the Court of Claims decision that the latter had jurisdiction over the claim, holding that the plaintiff's claim did not directly and proximately grow out of the treaty. 80 Rather, the claim was
authority in the specreated by a subsequent congressional act vesting
8
cial court to initially determine such claims.' 3
United States v. Old Settlers"' narrowed the already limited
scope of the treaty exception. The Court construed the "claim arising
from or growing out of a treaty" test to mean a claim involving rights
given or protected by a treaty.3 8 This rule was circumvented in Old
Settlers, though, because Congress had passed legislation authorizing
the Court of Claims to settle claims growing out of the treaty between
the petitoners' tribe and the United States Government. "
Courts faced with Iranian assets litigation have attempted to resolve both scope of executive power and taking questions raised by the
implementation of the Iranian Agreements. The two decisions that
most graphically demonstrate the conflicting conclusions of the lower
courts and which prompted the Supreme Court to grant Dames &
Moore a writ of certiorari, are Charles T. Main International,Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority " and Marschalk Co. v. Iran
36
National Airlines Corp.'
37
Main and Marshchalk are factually identical in relevant part.
125. Id.
126. 127 U.S. 51 (1888).
127. Id.
128. Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, United States-Great Britain, 17 Stat. 863,
T.S. No. 133.
129. 127 U.S. at 53.
130. Id. at 57.
131. Id. at 56-57.
132. 148 U.S. 427 (1893).
133. Id. at 468-69.
134. Id. at 468.
135. 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981).
136. 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981). The Marschalk case is analyzed solely to present and contrast the differing views of the lower
courts and the parties involved in Iranian assets litigation.
137. Main, 651 F.2d at 803-05; Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 76-77. The Marschalk
court pointed out that, unlike other Iranian assets litigation cases involving commercial

1981)

COMMENT

After President Carter issued the order blocking Iranian assets and authorized revocable prejudgment attachments, the petitioners sued the
Government of Iran and others in federal court to recover money owed
for services performed under contract. 1 8 Prejudgment attachments
were approved by the trial court.'5s After the negotiations for the hostages' release culminated in the Iranian Agreements, the petitioners
claimed 1) that the President exceeded his constitutional powers, and
2) that the terms of the agreements,
executive orders and regulations
40
effected a fifth amendment taking.'
Both courts borrowed Justice Jackson's framework to structure
their analyses of the executive power issues."M But the conclusions that
the courts drew from their analyses diverged greatly.
The Main court rejected the claimant's arguments. The court held:
a) that Congress, via the IEEPA, had expressly authorized the President to nullify the attachments and to transfer the blocked assets;1'4
and b) that the President possessed the inherent power to suspend
United States nationals' claims against the Government of Iran and its
governmental entities." 8 It further held: a) that nullification of the petitioner's attachments did not constitute a fifth amendment taking;"'
and b) that the question of whether the President's action settling
pe5
titioner's claim constituted a taking was not ripe for review."
The court began its analysis by focusing on the language of the
IEEPA."4 It found that the President properly "'direct[ed] and corntransactions that occurred outside the United States, this case involved a transaction
that occurred wholly within the borders of the United States. Nevertheless, the court
admitted that the issues involved in the case were the same. Id. at 73.
138. Main, 651 F.2d at 803-05; Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 77.
139. Main, 651 F.2d at 803-04; Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 77.
140. Main, 651 F.2d at 805. The plaintiffs in Main instituted a separate action
against the United States Government, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 77. The United States intervened in the Marschalk contract
action. Id.
141. Main, 651 F.2d at 805-06; Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 77-78.
142. Main, 651 F.2d at 808-09.
143. Id. at 810.
144. Id. at 808-09.
145. Id. at 814-15.
146. IEEPA, supra, note 8, § 1701(a)(1) authorizes the President to:
(A) investigate, regulate or prohibit (i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
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pel[led]' the 'transfer' . . . of Iranian assets, 'nullify[ing]' certain 'rights'
and 'privileges' acquired in them. 14 7 This interpretation, the court
felt, was reinforced by Orvis,14 which construed the TWEA as making
a presidential blocking order impervious to judicial attachment. 149 The
Main court did not, however, read the IEEPA as authorizing the suspension of United States nationals' claims against Iran."O
Turning to an examination of the Executive's inherent power to
suspend claims, the court found that, though the President's actions
may be within the zone of twilight in which he and Congress have concurrent authority, the Executive had the inherent power to do so.'
The court noted that the practice of settling claims by United States
nationals against the government of another nation through executive
agreements is well-established. 2 The court recognized, moreover, that
under United States v. Pink,5 s the Executive's power to settle claims
was incidental to its general powers in foreign affairs, a realm in which
5 4
the President normally has broad discretion to take action.
The petitioner's taking claims were quickly dismantled. The court
found that no compensable property right had been created when the
It characterized the petitioner's attachattachment was obtained.'
ment as "ab initio subordinate to the President's IEEPA powers" because the attachment was obtained after the blocking order went into
effect.'5 6 The petitioner was able to obtain the attachment only because the regulations promulgated pursuant to the blocking order authorized revocable prejudgment attachments; these regulations simultaneously prohibited the petitioner from levying on the assets in any
manner to satisfy its claim. 157 The court found that the question of
whether the claims settlement agreement constituted a taking was not
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving
any property in which any foreign country or national thereof has any
interest; by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
147. 651 F.2d at 806.
148. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
149. Id. at 188.
150. 651 F.2d at 807-08.
151. The court rejected the claimants' argument that the President was prohibited
from settling claims by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1976) [hereinafter cited as FSIA]. The court interpreted the FSIA as addressing commercial claims in general and not as reflecting adversely on the President's claims settlement powers during specific international emergencies. 651 F.2d at 813.
152. 651 F.2d at 810-11.
153. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
154. 651 F.2d at 811-12.
155. Id. at 807.
156. Id. at 808.
157. Id. at 808-09.
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ripe for review because the petitioner was provided with an as yet
unexhausted alternative method of satisfying its claim, viz., submission
of the claim to the Claims Tribunal.158 Until that method was exhausted, petitioner's claim would be considered speculative.15 9
In contrast to the Main court's response, the Marschalk1 60 court
agreed with its plaintiff's contentions in toto. The court held a) that
the Executive possessed neither the power to suspend the plaintiff's
contract claim6 1 nor the power to nullify its attachment, 16' and b) that
such actions by the Executive contravened the fifth amendment Just
Compensation Clause.168
The court, in addressing the claims suspension issue, characterized
the President's action as an effort to alter the jurisdiction of the
courts.
It found that Congress, in enacting the FSIA,1 5 had expressly prohibited the suspension of United States nationals' claims
against a foreign state.'" The FSIA ended the State Department practice of filing case-by-case "suggestions of immunity" to which courts
would normally defer in commercial suits against a foreign state, instead placing responsibility for determining immunity solely in the
hands of the courts. 1 67 An examination of the FSIA's legislative history
revealed that Congress had refused to adopt provisions permitting the
President to determine the jurisdiction of the courts in times of international emergency. 1 "6 In light of its reading of the FSIA, the court
concluded that the Executive did not possess inherent authority to suspend the plaintiff's claim. 169
Turning to the nullification of attachments issue, the court found
that the plaintiff obtained a valid legal attachment, the nullification of
which was not authorized by the IEEPA.170 It acknowledged that a lit158. Id. at 814-15.
159. Id.
160. 518 F. Supp. at 69.

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 95-98.
Id. at 98-100.
Id. at 82.

165. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
166. 518 F. Supp. at 82-83.

167. Id. at 81.
168. Id. at 82.
169. Id. at 91-92.
170. Id. at 97. The court disavowed the assertion that Orvis v. Brownell stood for the
proposition that the TWEA permitted the President to nullify attachment liens in foreign property obtained by United States nationals. Rather, it read Orvis as holding that
an unauthorized attachment, which was obtained after the freezing order went into effect, did not amount to a property interest which the Executive would have to recognize.
Such a transfer was not prohibited in Marschalk, since a general license was granted
permitting pre-judgment attachments. Id. at 96-97.
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eral reading of IEEPA would support the nullification order.'" The
legislative history of the pertinent section of the IEEPA revealed, however, that Congress intended to grant authority to the Executive only
"to control or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is
involved." ' In addition, the IEEPA's predecessor statute, the TWEA,
revealed that its purpose was "to define, regulate, and punish trading
with the enemy," and not to authorize an exercise of executive power
as a citizen's court-conferred
to nullify what the court1 characterized
73
rights in foreign property.
Despite having held that the President exceeded his constitutional
powers by suspending the plaintiff's claim and nullifying its attachment, the court reached out to decide the plaintiff's taking claims. After stating the general principle that a contract claim is a compensable
property right,17 4 it concluded that settlement of the plaintiff's claim
75
by relegating it to the Claims Tribunal constituted a taking.1 A taking was established because the plaintiff would have to pursue the
claim in a foreign country, forcing the petitioner to expend additional
time and money, because the Tribunal would be "overly political" and
would not offer due process guarantees, including the right to an appeal. Furthermore, only a twenty70 percent recovery of the plaintiff's
claim was ensured in that forum.1
The plaintiff's attachment was also found to be a compensable
77
and Louisville
property right under Armstrong v. United States1
8
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Redford.7 These cases were interpreted as
holding that a materialman's lien and a mortgage lien were compensable property rights. 7 9 Since this right was completely abrogated, the
court concluded that a taking had occurred. 80
Lastly, the question of whether a remedy was available to the
plaintiff to adjudicate its taking claim was considered. The terms of
the agreements, orders and regulations did not provide such a rem171. Id. at 95.
172. S.REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.

CODS

CONG. & AD. NEWs 4540, 4543.

173. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
174. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579. (1933).
175. 518 F. Supp. at 93-94.
176. Id.
177. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
178. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
179. 518 F. Supp. at 98.
180. Id. at 100. In the eyes of the court, the revocability of the authorization permitting attachments merely meant that, after a revocation had been effected, no property
interest may thereafter be obtained. Having a large sum in attorney's fees and in posting
a bond to obtain the attachment, the court felt that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that the attachment would not thereafter be nullified. Id. at 99-100.
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edy.'18 Nor did the court find that the Tucker Act afforded the plaintiff a forum. The court reasoned that the executive agreement was
equivalent to a treaty for purposes of this inquiry, and the treaty exception to the Tucker Act precludes the bringing of a taking claim
based on the terms of a treaty."6 2 Therefore, irrespective of the existence vel non of executive power to otherwise take such actions, the
agreements, orders and regulations were invalid insofar as they contravened the fifth amendment's Just Compensation Clause.188
8 Justice
Writing for the majority'8 4 in Dames & Moore v. Regan,'1
Rehnquist resolved the conflicting lower court conclusions by upholding the constitutionality of the actions taken by the Executive
Branch.' 6 The Court held: a) that Congress expressly authorized the
nullification of attachments and transfer of assets;187 b) that the petitioner's attachment was not a compensable property right;'s c) that
Congress implicitly authorized the suspension of claims;'"9 and d) that
the petitioner's contention that the suspension of its contract claim
constituted a taking was not ripe for review.'"
After invoking the analytical framework for determining executive
power devised by Justice Jackson, the Court began its analysis by focusing on the IEEPA. 9' Express congressional authorization to nullify
attachments and transfer the blocked assets was found in the language
of section 1702(a)(1), which authorized the President to "'direct and
compel' the 'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of the assets,
'nullify[ing]' cer'
tain 'rights' and 'privileges' acquired in them.' 9
The legislative history of the IEEPA and the TWEA buttressed
the Court's construction of the aforementioned section. Though Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that by replacing the TWEA with the
IEEPA Congress imposed certain limitations on the President's peacetime emergency powers, he asserted that those limitations did not affect the President's authority to take the actions in question.'9 8 Having
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 100-01.

184. The Court's decision in respect to executive power was unanimous. Seven Justices joined the section of Justice Rehnquist's decision with the taking issues.
185. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
186. Id. at 659-90.
187. Id. at 674.
188. Id. at 674 n.6.
189. Id. at 686-88. Justice Rehnquist writes that Congress has not passed legislation
expressing disapproval of the President's action, thereby not resisting the exercise of

Presidential authority. Id. at 687-88.
190. Id. at 688-89.
191.

50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. IH 1979).

192.
193.

453 U.S. at 670-71 (quoting Main, 651 F.2d at 806).
See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673. The Court stated that Congress, in limit-
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removed those limitations as a consideration, he was free to refer back
to Propper v. Clark,19' a case interpreting the TWEA, to find that "the
congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders [was] 'to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President . . .'

911Justice

Rehnquist postulated that blocking orders permitted the President to
use the blocked assets as a bargaining chip when dealing with a hostile
country and concluded that Congress could not have intended that an
individual be allowed to restrict the bargaining chip on the basis of
attachments obtained under a revocable authorization after the blocking order was entered. 19" Orvis v. Brownel1 97 supported the Court's
conclusion because Orvis prohibited the use of the type of attachment
in question "to limit in any way the actions the President may take
under section 1702 respecting blocked assets." 1 "
Dismissing the petitioner's claim that nullification of its attachment constituted a taking, the Court found that that no compensable
property right had been created."' The petitioner argued that the order revoking all authorizations for obtaining attachments merely prevented the petitioner from obtaining future ones and left intact its attachments already obtained under the Treasury regulations.,"
According to the Court, the fact that any attachment was null and void
"unless licensed" and that all licenses were revocable at any time refuted the petitioner's construction of the regulations. 0 1 Common sense
also dictated that the President could not have intended that those
who obtained attachments after the blocking order went into effect
would have the power to wrest control of the blocked assets from the
President's hands.0 2
Turning to the question of the President's authority to suspend
ing the President's emergency power in peacetime, did not intend to affect the President's authority to take the action taken here. Id.
194. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
195. Id. at 493.
196. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673-74.
197. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
198. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672 n.5. The Court stated this proposition after
rejecting petitoner's argument that it was the "vesting" provisions of the TWEA that
gave the President the power to dispose permanently of assets, and that when Congress
enacted the IEEPA it intentionally omitted granting that power. Instead, the Court
found that section 1702 clearly authorized the President to "direct and compel" the
"transfer, withdrawal, transportation ....
or exportation of... property in which any
foreign country... has an interest... ." Id.
199. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 n.6. Petitioner was unsuccessful in his

attempt to persuade the Court that only the licenses and not the attachments themselves
were revocable. Id.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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claims pending in American courts, the Court rejected both the IEEPA
and the Hostage Act as sources of specific congressional authorization.2 0 3 The IEEPA was not applicable because claims of American citizens against Iran were not in themselves efforts to exercise any rights
with respect to Iranian property.2 0 4 Such a claim was merely an effort
to establish liability and to fix damages. 05 Likewise, congressional authorization could not be found in the Hostage Act. 06 Though it contained broad language, its legislative history revealed that Congress
wanted to afford protection to naturalized United States citizens who,
while travelling abroad, were repatriated against their will by certain
countries that refused to recognize their citizenship.20 7
Neverthless, the Court concluded that Congress had indirectly authorized the President's action.2 08 Justice Rehnquist evaluated the
"general tenor" of legislation in the area of international claims settlement to determine whether Congress had invited independent executive action.20 ' He utilized both the IEEPA and the Hostage Act as indicia of congressional acceptance of a broad executive authority in the
present circumstances.2 10 The "sweeping and unqualified" language of
the IEEPA authorized the President to take broad actions against foreign property during a national emergency.2 1 Similarly, the legislative
history of the Hostage Act, in which statements such as "[t]he President ought to have the power to do what the exigencies of the case
require to rescue a citizen from imprisonment,"21 2 appear indicated a
203. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. The Court added a caveat to this conculsion stating that the statutes are not wholly irrelevant in deciding whether or not Presi-

dential action in this area is valid. Id.
204. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675. The American claims were not even in and
of themselves transactions involving Iranian property. Id.
205. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675. All courts that have addressed this issue

have reached the same conclusion. Id.
206. Id. at 676-77.
207. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1868), which provides that it is the President's
duty to demand that any government that is unjustly depriving a United States citizen
of his liberty state the reasons for such deprivation. If such incarceration appears in
violation of the rights of a United States citizen, the President shall demand the release
of such citizen. In the event that the demanded release is refused or delayed, the President is granted such power as may be necessary and proper to effectuate the release. Id.
208. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688. Where the settlement of a claim is considered necessary to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute to which the United
States is a party, the Court concluded that Congress acquiesces in the President's action
and it cannot be said that the President is without the power to settle the claim. Id.
209. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. The Court noted that it would not be
possible for Congress to anticipate and legislate every possible action that might be required of the President in every possible situation. Id.
210. Id. at 677.
211. Id.
212. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4357 (1868). Senator Williams, who
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congressional desire to rest broad discretion
in the President to re13
states."
foreign
of
acts
hostile
spond to
Prior instances of congressional acquiescence in the type of action
taken by the President fortified the validity of his actions. The Court
observed that a longstanding practice of settling claims of United
States nationals against foreign countries by executive agreement had
been established, s ' and that the Executive had sometimes disposed of
such claims without the nationals' consent.'" Justice Rehnquist
stressed that, not only did Congress acquiesce, but it also implicitly
approved this executive practice. 1 6 Such approval, according to Justice
Rehnquist, was affirmatively demonstrated by the enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA) of 1949.1", He posited that
the ICSA was enacted to provide a procedure whereby funds received
from an executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia could be distributed to United States nationals, and that its legislative history revealed that Congress contemplated similar settlements in the future."18
Moreover, Congress often amended the ICSA to solve particular
problems that arose from subsequent settlement agreements entered
drafted the language that is embodied in the Hostage Act, stated that, in providing a
remedy, it is necessary to allow the President some discretion in order for him to apply
such remedy to the specific dispute as it arises. The means adopted must be tailored to
each country with its own system of government. Id.
213. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677.
214. Id. at 680. The Court cited ten instances of claim settlement via executive agreement: Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States-China, 30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S.
No. 9306; Agreement Concerning Expropriated Assets of Marcona Mining Company,
Sept. 22, 1976, United States-Peru, 27 U.S.T. 3993, T.I.A.S. No. 8417; Agreement Respecting Claims of United States Nationals, May 1, 1976, United States-Egypt, 27 U.S.T.
4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8446; Agreement Respecting Settlement of Certain Claims, Feb. 19,
1974, United States-Peru, 25 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 7792; Agreement Concerning Settlement of Claims, Mar. 6, 1973, United States-Hungary, 24 U.S.T. 522, T.I.A.S. No.
7569; Agreement Concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, April 18, 1969,
United States-Japan, 20 U.S.T. 2654, T.I.A.S. No. 6724; Agreement Regarding Claims of
United States Nationals, Nov. 5, 1964, United States-Yugoslavia, 16 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 5750; Agreement Regarding Claims of United States Nationals, July 16, 1960, United
States-Poland, 11 U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545; Agreement Relating to Financial Questions, Mar. 30, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451; Agreement Regarding Claims of
United States Nationals and Related Financial Matters, July 2, 1963, United StatesBulgaria, 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387. Id. at 680 n.9.
215. 453 U.S. at 680. The Court cited RESTATEMENT (SacoND) OF FORIGN RmATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213 (1965), which states that the "President 'may waive or
settle a claim against a foreign state.., even without the consent of the [injured] national.'" 453 U.S. at 680.
216. 453 U.S. at 681.
217. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644(m) (1979), amended by Act of Mar. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-209, 94 Stat. 96 (1980).
218. 453 U.S. at 680-81.

1981]

COMMENT

into by the President. 21 s More recent approval was found in the legislative history of the IEEPA,2 20 which indicated to Justice Rehnquist that
Congress had intended not to infringe in any way on the President's
authority to block assets, or to impede settlement of United States nationals' claims against foreign countries.2 1
Aside from indirect congressional approval, the Court recognized
inherent power in the Executive to enter claims settlement agreements,
relying on United States v. Pink and Ozanic v. United States.2 3
Justice Rehnquist construed Pink as upholding the validity of an executive agreement "whereby the Soviet Union assigned to the United
States amounts owed to [the USSR] by American nationals so that
outstanding claims of other nationals could be paid. '22 " Underlying the
Pink decision, he felt, was the principle that the power to remove
claims of United States nationals as obstacles to full recognition of a
foreign state is a "modest implied power of the President."' 5 Such
power of the President was expanded beyond the scope of Pink by the
Ozanic court. Justice Rehnquist felt it would be unreasonable to circumscribe the President's power to situations involving the recognition
of a foreign state, since "[tihe continued mutual amity between this
nation and other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory
compromise of mutual claims ....
The Court devoted its remaining analysis of the claims settlement
issue to refuting the petitioner's two main arguments opposing a finding that Congress implicitly approved the longstanding executive practice described by the Court. Justice Rehnquist circumvented the petitioner's argument that all pre-1952 claims settlements and case law
should be disregarded because the United States abandoned the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity in 1952 and that therefore United
States nationals no longer needed executive assistance to sell their
claims.2 27 He acknowledged the possible merit of the petitioner's argument, but assumed that even if the petitioner was correct, the ten or
more settlement agreements entered into after 1952 resurrect the con219. Id. at 681. The Court specifically examined settlements between the United
States and China, East Germany and Vietnam. Id.
220. Supra note 7. For the legislative history of the Act, see S. REP. No. 466, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4540, 4544.
221. 453 U.S. at 681-82.
222. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
223. 188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951).
224. 453 U.S. at 682-83. The Court notes the similarity of Judge Learned Hand's
opinion in Ozanic to the holding in Pink. Id.
225. Id. at 683 (quoting 315 U.S. at 229-30).
226. Ozanic, 188 F.2d at 231.
227. 453 U.S. at 683-84.
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gressional acquiescence in the executive practice."'
Justice Rehnquist also refused to accept the petitioner's argument
that Congress divested the Executive of the power to settle claims
when the FSIA 2 9 was enacted.13 0 The petitioner urged that, since the
FSIA's principle purpose was to depoliticize immunity decisions in
commercial suits against foreign governments by placing those decisions solely in the hands of the courts, the President had circumscribed
the jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of article
III of
23 1
the Constitution when he suspended the petitioner's claim.
The Court responded by declaring that the Executive did not attempt to divest the courts of jurisdiction and that the petitioner read
the FSIA much too broadly.232 By way of analogy, Justice Rehnquist
explained that, just as a determination of sovereign immunity does not
divest the federal court of jurisdiction, suspension of claims does not
do so."' Rather, the President's order "effected a change in the substantive law governing the lawsuit."' ' Here, apparently, the rule of law
was that claims that could be brought before the Claims Tribunal had
no legal effect in United States courts until the Claims Tribunal determined that the claim was not within its jurisdiction. 2 5
The Court viewed the petitioner's reading of the FSIA as much too
broad because it was "designed to remove one particular barrier to
suit, namely soveriegn immunity," and because Congress had "rejected
several proposals designed to limit the power of the President to enter
.. . claims settlement agreements. ' 23 s Moreover, the same Congress
that enacted the FSIA also enacted the IEEPA, the legislative history
of which "stressed that nothing in the IEEPA was to impede the set' 23 7
tlement of claims of United States citizens.
228. Id. Justice Rehnquist also noted that even if these pre-1952 cases should be
disregarded, congressional acquiescence since 1952 is supportive as evidence of the President's power in the instant case. Id. at 684.
229. FSIA, supra note 103.
230. 453 U.S. at 684.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 685.
233. Id. The Court viewed the suspension of claims as illustrative of the difference
between modifying federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a different
rule of law. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. While Justice Rehnquist did not articulate what the rule of law was that was
changed, it appears that claims that could be brought before the Claims Tribunal had no
legal effect in the United States courts until the Claims Tribunal determined that the
claim was not within its jurisdiction.
236. Id. See, e.g., Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.
632 and S. 1251 Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 243-61, 302-11 (1975).
237. 453 U.S. at 686.
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Having found that the claims settlement agreement was a constitutional exercise of executive power, the Court paused to state that the
petitioner's taking claim in this regard was not ripe for review.2 88
Nonetheless, the possibility that a taking might be effected by the
President's actions forced the Court to determine whether the petitioner had available a remedy under the Tucker Act.' 8 ' This determination was necessary because "there must be at the time of taking a
reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation. ' 24 0 The only bar to bringing suit in the Court of Claims would be
section 1502, the "treaty exception. '24 1 Justice Rehnquist held, without
explanation, that the exception was not a bar, though the Court did
4
indicate that the Government conceded the point.1 '
Justice Powell, concurring and dissenting in part,' 43 disagreed with
the majority's decision that the petitioner's attachment was not a compensable property right.144 He questioned whether "the orders themselves may have effected a taking by making conditional the attachments that claimants against Iran otherwise could have obtained
without condition.'' 4 He also questioned whether "the revocability of
the license under which the petitioner obtained its attachments suffices
to render revocable the attachments themselves,' 46 since, under Armstrong v. United States 47 and Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Redford,'" "it [was] settled that an attachment entitling a creditor to
resort to specific property for the satisfaction of a claim is a property
right compensable under the fifth amendment.''4 Justice Powell
would have left the taking claim "open for resolution on a case-by-case
50
basis in actions before the Court of Claims.'2
The key to Justice Rehnquist's decision upholding the constitutionality of the nullification of the attachments and the suspension of
claims by the Executive appears to be the finding of congressional au238. Id. at 688-89.
239. Id. at 689. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1507 (Supp. III 1979).
240. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890).
241. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
242. 453 U.S. at 689.
243. Id. at 690-91. Justice Stevens also concurred. Though he joined in the remaining
portions of the opinion, he would not have addressed the question of whether the petitioners would be able to bring a taking claim in the Court of Claims, based on the suspension of the petitioner's claim. He believed that the possibility that a taking would
occur was too remote. Id. at 690.
244. Id. at 690 n.1.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
248. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
249. 453 U.S. at 690 n.1.
250. Id. at 690.
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thorization.' 5 ' Whenever the Court perceives that the other two
branches of the federal government have acted in concert, or at least
that Congress has acquiesced in the Executive's actions, the Court is
reluctant to interfere, especially when the Executive is acting in the
realm of foreign affairs. Though Justice Rehnquist belabored the point
that the opinion was written solely to answer the specific questions
presented,25 ' it will provide guidelines in the future when the President
enters into an agreement to resolve disputes with other states.
Louis D. Montresor

251. See, e.g., id. at 680, where the Court indicated that "tcirucial to our decision
today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement." Id.
252. See 453 U.S. at 659-60, 688-90.

